Thank you Mr. Chair.

The United Kingdom reiterates its support for this resolution and welcomes the significant number of co-sponsoring states.

This year, we have looked on in horror as Putin launched his unprovoked, illegal war, bringing untold suffering to the innocent people of Ukraine. But we are acutely aware that for people in Crimea, this story began eight years ago, in 2014.

Since then, they have endured a brutal and systematic campaign of human rights violations and abuses at the hands of the Russian authorities: arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, and unjustifiable restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of movement, expression and religion or belief. Many of these measures have been disproportionately targeted at ethnic and religious minorities, in particular Crimean Tatars.

Since Russia’s invasion this February, the human rights situation in Crimea has only further deteriorated. This resolution highlights that Crimea has become both a base from which to launch attacks on the rest of Ukraine, and a blueprint for further Russian human rights abuses in Ukrainian territory. We condemn the conscription and mobilisation of Ukrainian civilians in Crimea into Russia’s Armed forces, and the forced imposition of Russian legislation further limiting freedom of expression, including the freedom to speak out against Russia’s brutal war.

And we regret that – despite this Committee’s repeated requests – Russia continues to deny access for international monitoring missions to Crimea and other regions of Ukraine under its temporary control.

Russia will undoubtedly accuse us of politicising this Committee. But the UK strongly defends the use of country-specific resolutions, which complement the work of the Human Rights Council and other fora in providing scrutiny of adherence to human rights obligations.
Indeed, on 4 November this year, this Committee adopted a resolution that noted with alarm that Russia has sought to justify its territorial aggression against Ukraine on the purported basis of eliminating neo-Nazism.

By failing to make even the weakest case against this language, Russia tacitly acknowledged what we all know: It has no justification for its aggression against Ukraine

Adoption of this resolution today will underline the international community’s support for Ukraine in their fight against that aggression, and their resolve to maintain pressure on Russia to bring an end to its systematic abuse of human rights in Ukraine.

Thank you.

Volodymyr Havrylov, Ukraine’s Deputy Defence Minister, visited the UK today to see the support being provided to assist his country’s armed forces.

Chair,

On behalf of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, I thank Director General Grossi for his latest report contained in GOV/2022/62, and Deputy Director General Aparo for his Technical Briefing. Once again, we commend the Agency for carrying out its mandate conferred by the United Nations Security Council – even given Iranian non-adherence with its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The E3 thank the Agency for its objective reporting of Iran’s activities with regards to these commitments and encourage the Director General to keep the Board informed regarding the Iranian nuclear programme in all its aspects. We would welcome the Agency’s last quarterly report on monitoring and verification in Iran to be made public.

The Director General very clearly reports that Iran is moving further and further away from its commitments agreed upon in 2015.

• Today, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile exceeds JCPoA limits by 18 times and comprises very concerning amounts of uranium enriched up to 5, 20 and 60 percent.
• Since the Director General`s last report as of September this year, Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 20 percent by 16 percent and its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent by 12 percent.
• There is no credible civilian justification for these activities which are inconsistent with Iran’s JCPoA commitments for both enrichment levels and quantities of enriched material.

This situation will only worsen in the near future if Iran does not decide to return to full compliance with its commitments under the JCPoA. Iran has also drastically increased production of uranium enriched up to 5 percent, enabling Iran to produce even more HEU in the future. In his report, the Director General notes Iran has rapidly increased its enrichment capabilities through the testing and installation of additional IR-1 centrifuges as well as of advanced centrifuges. For example,

• At the underground location in Natanz, Iran has significantly increased the number of centrifuges producing uranium enriched up to 5 percent.
• More than half of Iran`s advanced centrifuges at Natanz have been installed since the beginning of this year.
• Iran’s knowledge gains from the operation of advanced centrifuges are irreversible.

In addition, the Director General once again emphasised in his report that Iran’s decision to stop cooperating with the Agency with regards to monitoring and verification activities agreed in the JCPoA has seriously affected the Agency’s knowledge of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran’s decision to remove Agency surveillance and monitoring equipment has, as the Director General says, detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran`s nuclear programme.

Chair,

These steps present a very clear picture: Iran continues its unprecedented nuclear escalation. This raises serious doubts as to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, which threatens regional and international security.

The E3, along with our partners, have done our utmost to negotiate a return to a reasonably restricted Iranian nuclear programme. After many months of negotiations, the JCPoA Coordinator tabled viable deals in March and again in August this year which would have returned Iran to full compliance with its JCPoA commitments and returned the US to the deal. Iran refused these packages with continued demands beyond the scope of the JCPoA, despite further efforts over the summer.

Chair,

The situation we are in is very dangerous. We urge Iran to immediately stop and reverse its nuclear escalation, allow for complete transparency with the IAEA by returning to full cooperation, and re-applying the Additional Protocol, as an important confidence-building step. We also recall that, under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Iran is legally obliged to implement Modified Code 3.1. and, according to international law, Iran cannot change its application or withdraw from it unilaterally.

Chair,

We will continue consultations, alongside international partners, on how best to address Iran’s unabated and dangerous nuclear escalation. Thank you.