Thousands of troubled children and teenagers teetering on the edge of crime will be put back on the right track thanks to the largest youth justice funding boost in a generation – cutting crime and making streets safer.

Around 80 percent of prolific adult offenders begin committing crimes as children, and the estimated cost of late intervention to the economy is nearly £17 billion per year.

That’s why the government is making the biggest investment in a generation – worth £300 million over the next 3 years – to support every single council across England and Wales in catching and preventing youth offending earlier than ever, helping to stop these children and teenagers from moving on to further, more serious offending.

And for the first time ever, local authorities will be given specific cash to intervene early with teenagers displaying signs such as poor school attendance, troubles at home, and a history of substance abuse which are known to be factors which often drive young people into crime – so they can steer them away from law-breaking before an offence is even committed.

Through ‘Turnaround’, a new early intervention scheme backed by £60 million, local Youth Offending Teams will be given extra funding to connect children and teenagers to targeted, wraparound support to stop them going down a path of criminality.

This could include mentoring, extra school tuition, sports clubs, help to address any issues at school or at home, with their mental health or with substance misuse, tackling the root causes of their behaviour and helping them to get their lives back on track.

Funding will also be used to bolster the day-to-day running of youth justice schemes and initiatives across the country, as well as support the work of the 20,000 additional police officers the government is committed to recruiting.

As part of today’s news, the Deputy Prime Minister, Dominic Raab, visited a community boxing scheme in Blackpool that is giving local children and teenagers an alternative to anti-social behaviour, giving them skills such as discipline and teamwork, and steering them away from potential offending and back into education and training.

Deputy Prime Minister, Lord Chancellor, and Secretary of State for Justice Dominic Raab said: > > Diverting more young people from gangs, drugs and violence will make our streets safer.

So, we’re investing £300 million in preventative initiatives, to deter criminal behaviour.

Our plan will ensure thousands more young people can turn their lives around – which will transform their lives and make our communities safer.

Minister for Youth Justice Victoria Atkins said:

Youth offending is a destructive force that blights communities and rips families apart.

This vital new funding will help us stop youth crime in its tracks by ensuring these children stay in education and rebuild ties with their families, helping us build safer, more prosperous communities.

Youth Justice Board Chair Keith Fraser said:

This is a smart and insightful investment by the government. If our youth justice teams are well-resourced to help children and families, we all benefit – from healthier, happier, safer children and from safer communities with fewer victims.

This investment highlights the importance of their work and is a huge opportunity for youth justice teams across England and Wales. I hope they feel rightly proud of the contribution they make to the safety of communities and the lives of children.

Ministers estimate that the Turnaround programme will reach up to 20,000 more children over three years who would not otherwise have received support to turn away from offending.

While many local authorities already run successful early intervention programmes, by providing funding over a three-year period, councils will have greater certainty and be able to plan longer-term – ultimately steering more children and teenagers than ever away from crime.

Ministers will also set out plans in due course to improve how funding is targeted to local authorities, to ensure funding reaches areas who need it most and to ensure local authorities’ interventions are effective.

It is fantastic to be standing here today in Chatham House to speak to you all about cyber and international law.

In 1982, on a visit to Japan, Margaret Thatcher presented a ZX Spectrum to the Japanese Prime Minister. “This is a Small. Home. Computer,” she told the bemused premier, before purposefully pressing a button on the keyboard which changed the screen to reveal a game of chess. Although by the end of the decade the British entrepreneur Sir Clive Sinclair had sold two and half million units of his ZX in the UK, for most people the personal computer was always just a bit of fun. Why would you painstakingly key in your contacts when you already had an address book?

40 years on, it’s hard to understate our reliance on computers. Just imagine how Margaret Thatcher would have reacted in 1982 if you had told her that the small electronic box in front of her would require defence from a dedicated state agency with a budget running into billions of pounds! As a sound fiscal conservative, she may have been tempted to knock it off the table, rather than showcase the British creation across the world.

Once-novel uses of cyber technology, like making a medical appointment or shopping online, have now become routine and sometimes unavoidable. And since an event occurring in cyberspace can have real world consequences, it’s clear that it requires increasing levels of international co-operation, as can be seen in the India-UK cyber statement agreed during the Prime Minister’s recent visit there. Such agreements help States to trade goods, services and ideas. Cyber activity is also now part of how some disputes or tension between countries play out.

Our reliance on cyber has, of course, created huge challenges. Events over the past 10 years, in particular, have demonstrated the vulnerability of critical sectors to disruptive State cyber activity. Perhaps most notoriously, the 2017 NotPetya cyber-attack, which masqueraded as ransomware but served principally to disrupt, affecting in particular Ukraine’s financial, energy and government institutions. But its indiscriminate design also caused wider disruption across the globe, costing firms in sectors of industry as varied as shipping, food production, pharmaceutical research and advertising, hundreds of millions in recovery costs. More recently, Microsoft reported that shortly before Russian’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (the GRU) targeted destructive malware against hundreds of systems across Ukraine affecting the IT, energy and financial sectors.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated, on the part of Russia, a callous disregard for established international rules. However, the unprecedented and united international response in support of Ukraine has also reinforced the value of having a framework that makes clear when State action is unlawful.

Cyber is part of the conflict. As Sir Jeremy Fleming recently noted, we have seen cyber in this conflict, and lots of it. The UK, US, EU and other allies announced last week that Russia has been behind a series of cyber-attacks since the start of its illegal invasion. The most recent attack on communications company Viasat in Ukraine had a wider impact across the continent, disrupting wind farms and internet users in central Europe. Putin is also waging a dangerous disinformation war, hiding the truth from the Russian people.

Shaping the international order

Commentators often talk in hushed tones of cyber weapons, with little understanding of what they are, or of the rules which govern how they are used. This misunderstanding means we can see every cyber incident as an act of warfare which threatens to bring down the modern world around us and it’s not uncommon for even seasoned observers to think in this way, as they speak of cyber as a new battlespace where no rules apply. But cyberspace is not a lawless ‘grey zone’. International law governs and plays a fundamental role in regulating cyberspace.

Which is why today I would like to set out how the UK considers international law applies in cyberspace during peacetime, against the backdrop of the Prime Minister’s Integrated Review and the Government’s National Cyber Strategy. With particular focus on the rule on non-intervention, its application to key sectors, and avenues for response.

I’m focusing on the law applicable in peacetime because the UK has already set out that cyber operations are capable of breaching the prohibition on the threat or use of force, and that the law applicable in armed conflict applies just the same to the use of cyber means as other means of waging war. And I want to be clear that in the same way that a country can lawfully respond when attacked militarily, there is also a basis to respond, and options available, in the face of hostile cyber operations in peacetime.

The UK was one of the very first States to articulate publicly its views on the application of international law in cyberspace. I will build on what one of my predecessors, Jeremy Wright QC, said when he was Attorney General in May 2018, here in Chatham House. At that time, it was considered necessary to set out the fundamentals of the UK view – that the rules-based international order extends to cyberspace, and that there are boundaries of acceptable State behaviour in cyberspace as there are anywhere else.

More recently, in June 2021, the UK published a statement as part of the United Nations ‘Group of Governmental Experts’ process, setting out the ways in which international law applies in cyberspace. And the UK continues to attach importance to States clearly setting out their views like this. Significantly, that UK statement concluded by noting the importance of moving “beyond discussion of general concepts and principles, and to be clear about what constitutes unlawful conduct in those sectors which are most vulnerable to destructive cyber conduct”.

One of the Integrated Review’s stated goals is for the United Kingdom to “shape the international order as it develops in future frontiers”. Cyberspace stands out among these future frontiers. The National Cyber Strategy priorities include promoting a “free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace”. International leadership and partnerships will be essential aspects of shaping and strengthening the international cyber governance framework to deliver these objectives. Partnerships like the ‘Quintet’ of Attorneys General, with my counterparts from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.

The United Kingdom’s aim is to ensure that future frontiers evolve in a way that reflects our democratic values and interests and those of our allies. We want to build on increasing activism by likeminded States when it comes to international cyber governance.

This includes making sure that the legal framework is properly applied, to protect the exercise of powers derived from the principle of State sovereignty – to which this Government attaches great importance – from external coercion by other States.

The law needs to be clear and well understood if it is to be part of a framework for governing international relations and to rein in irresponsible cyber behaviour. Setting out more detail on what constitutes unlawful activity by States will bring greater clarity about when certain types of robust measures are justified in response.

The rule on non-intervention

Turning to the law – one of the rules of customary international law which is of particular importance in this area is the rule on non-intervention.

Customary international law is the general practice of States accepted as law. As such, it is not static. It develops over time according to what States do and what they say. It can adapt to accommodate change in the world, including technological advances. Customary international law is a framework that can adapt to new frontiers and which governs States’ behaviour.

A well-known formulation of the rule on non-intervention comes from the International Court of Justice in its Military and Paramilitary Activities judgment. According to the Court in that case, all States or groups of States are forbidden from intervening –

…directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.

The UK’s position is that the rule on non-intervention provides a clearly established basis in international law for assessing the legality of State conduct in cyberspace during peacetime.

It serves as a benchmark by which to assess lawfulness, to hold those responsible to account, and to calibrate responses.

This rule is particularly important in cyberspace for two main reasons.

First, the rule on non-intervention lies at the heart of international law, serving to protect matters that are core to State sovereignty. As long ago as 1966, the UK made clear its position that:

…the principle of non-intervention, as it applied in relations between States, [is] not explicitly set forth in the United Nations Charter but flow[s] directly and by necessary implication from the prohibition of the threat or use of force and from the principle of the sovereign equality of States…

Four years later, in 1970, the UK set out its view that “non-intervention reflected the principle of the sovereign equality of states.” And that these principles were equally valid and interrelated. More colloquially, we might say that sovereignty and non-intervention are two sides of the same coin.

States have expressed different views on the precise significance of sovereignty in cyberspace. The UK reiterated its own position on this point as recently as June 2021. Namely, that any prohibition on the activities of States, whether in relation to cyberspace or other matters, must be clearly established in international law. The general concept of sovereignty by itself does not provide a sufficient or clear basis for extrapolating a specific rule of sovereignty or additional prohibition for cyber conduct going beyond that of non-intervention.

What matters in practice is whether there has been a violation of international law. Differences in legal reasoning must not obscure the common ground which I believe exists when it comes to certain types of unacceptable and unlawful cyber behaviours. I think that common ground also extends to an appreciation that we must carefully preserve the space for perfectly legitimate everyday cyber activity which traverses multiple international boundaries millions of times a second.

Second, the rule on non-intervention is also of increasing relevance due to the prevalence of hostile activity by States that falls below the threshold of the use of force or is on the margins of it. In such circumstances, the rule on non-intervention becomes particularly significant as another benchmark by which States can define behaviour as unlawful.

Threshold for a prohibited intervention

Having identified the importance of the rule on non-intervention, I will now turn to the threshold for its application. The fact that behaviour attributed to another State is unwelcome, irresponsible, or indeed hostile, does not mean that it is also unlawful. A core element of the non-intervention rule is that the offending behaviour must be coercive.

Coercion was rightly described in the Military and Paramilitary Activities case as “the very essence” of a prohibited intervention. It is this coercive element that most obviously distinguishes an intervention prohibited under international law from, for example, more routine and legitimate information-gathering and influencing activities that States carry out as part of international relations.

But what exactly is coercion?

Some have characterised coercion as forcing a State to act differently from how it otherwise would – that is, compelling it into a specific act or omission. Imagine, for example, a cyber operation to delay another State’s election, or to prevent it from distributing tax revenues to fund essential services. To my mind, these are certainly forms of coercion.

But I want to be clear today that coercion can be broader than this. In essence, an intervention in the affairs of another State will be unlawful if it is forcible, dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, depriving a State of its freedom of control over matters which it is permitted to decide freely by the principle of State sovereignty. While the precise boundaries of coercion are yet to crystallise in international law, we should be ready to consider whether disruptive cyber behaviours are coercive even where it might not be possible to point to a specific course of conduct which a State has been forced into or prevented from taking.

Of course, in considering whether the threshold for a prohibited intervention is met, all relevant circumstances, including the overall scale and effect of a cyber operation, need to be considered. But I believe that we can and should be clearer about the types of disruptive State activity which are likely to be unlawful in cyberspace.

Illustrative examples

It is therefore important to bring the non-intervention rule to life in the cyber context, through examples of what kinds of cyber behaviours could be unlawful in peacetime. To move the focus to the types of coercive and disruptive behaviours that responsible States should be clear are unlawful when it comes to the conduct of international affairs in peacetime.

And being clear on what is unlawful means we can then be clearer on the range of potential options that can lawfully be taken in response. That is, the kinds of activities which would require legal justification, for example, as a proportionate response to prior illegality by another State. This is crucial in enabling States to act within the law whilst taking robust and decisive action.

With that in mind, today I will set out new detail to illustrate how this rule applies. A non-exhaustive list, to move this discussion forward. I will cover four of the most significant sectors that are vulnerable to disruptive cyber conduct: energy security; essential medical care; economic stability; and democratic processes.

Ensuring the provision of essential medical services and secure and reliable energy supply to a population are sovereign functions of a State. They are matters in respect of which international law affords free choice to States. The Integrated Review highlights the interconnected nature of the global health system, and the importance of building resilience to address global health risks. Covid is a clear example. Likewise, energy security is recognised as including protection of critical national infrastructure from cyber security risks.

Covert cyber operations by a foreign State which coercively restrict or prevent the provision of essential medical services or essential energy supplies would breach the rule on non-intervention.

Of course, every case needs to be assessed on its facts, but prohibited cyber activity in the energy and medical sectors could include:

• disruption of systems controlling emergency medical transport (e.g., telephone dispatchers);
• causing hospital computer systems to cease functioning;
• disruption of supply chains for essential medicines and vaccines;
• preventing the supply of power to housing, healthcare, education, civil administration and banking facilities and infrastructure;
• causing the energy supply chain to stop functioning at national level through damage or prevention of access to pipelines, interchanges, and depots; or *preventing the operation of power generation infrastructure.

Turning to economic stability, covert cyber operations by a foreign State that coercively interfere with a State’s freedom to manage its domestic economy, or to ensure provision of domestic financial services crucial to the State’s financial system, would breach the rule on non-intervention.

Such cyber operations could include disruption to the networks controlling a State’s fundamental ability to conduct monetary policy or to raise and distribute revenue, for instance through taxation. Or disruption to systems which support lending, saving and insurance across the economy.

Lastly, democratic processes. Free and open elections, using processes in which a population has confidence, are an essential part of the political system in democratic States. All States have the freedom to make their views known about processes in other countries – delivering hard, sometimes unwelcome messages, and drawing attention to concerns. This is part and parcel of international relations. However, covert cyber operations by a foreign State which coercively interfere with free and fair electoral processes would constitute a prohibited intervention.

Again, every activity needs to be assessed on its facts, but such activities could include:

• operations that disrupt the systems which control electoral counts to change the outcome of an election; or
• operations to disrupt another State’s ability to hold an election at all, for example by causing systems to malfunction with the effect of preventing voter registration.

I hope that these illustrative examples will assist in the future when considering what is unlawful in cyberspace.

I should also add that the nature of cyberspace means that it may not be evident, at least at first, whether a State is responsible for a particular action. This is also a space in which criminal gangs operate for financial profit. To be clear, State direction or control of non-State actors who undertake cyber operations of the kind I have described today would also represent unlawful conduct by that State, in line with international law on State responsibility. Cyber is no different from other spheres of activity in this sense. Provided that it is exercising the requisite degree of direction or control, a State is no less responsible for internationally unlawful cyber operations conducted by a ransomware gang than it would be for the unlawful actions of an armed group, or a corporation.

Response options

If a State carries out irresponsible, hostile, or unlawful cyber activity, what then are the options available to the victim State?

There are a wide range of effective response options available to impose a cost on States carrying out irresponsible or hostile cyber activity, regardless of whether the cyber activity constitutes an internationally unlawful act. These kinds of measures, referred to as acts of retorsion in international law, could include economic sanctions, restrictions on freedom of movement, exclusion from international groupings and wider diplomatic measures. So, there are always options available to stand up to unacceptable behaviour. And you do not have to look far to see how the impact of taking these kinds of measures is amplified when acting alongside other like-minded States.

Let me be clear. This means that when states like Russia or China carry out irresponsible or hostile cyber activity, the UK and our allies are always able to take action, whether or not the activity was itself unlawful. Today that might be in response to hostile cyber activity occurring in Ukraine, tomorrow it could be a response to hostile activity in Taiwan.

Where a State falls victim to unlawful cyber activity carried out against it by another State, it may also be appropriate to pursue remedies through the courts. Current events in Ukraine have demonstrated the continued relevance of forums like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the context of a wider response. The UK has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and we encourage others to do likewise.

Beyond this, under the international law doctrine of countermeasures, a State may respond to a prior unlawful act, in ways which would under normal circumstances be unlawful, in order to stop the offending behaviour and ensure reparation. The UK has previously made clear that countermeasures are available in response to unlawful cyber operations by another State. It is also clear that countermeasures need not be of the same character as the threat and could involve non-cyber means, where it is the right option in order to bring unlawful behaviour in cyberspace to an end.

However, some countries simply do not have the capability to respond effectively by themselves in the face of hostile and unlawful cyber intrusions. It is open to States to consider how the international law framework accommodates, or could accommodate, calls by an injured State for assistance in responding collectively.
Free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace

I’ve focused today on the application of international law to cyberspace, but I also want to touch on the broader context. Applying the international law framework to this new frontier is just one part of a wide-ranging international effort, by the UK and other like-minded States, to promote a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace.

There are a range of additional measures currently being taken domestically and internationally to counter harmful behaviour in cyberspace. Improving cyber resilience is central to reducing cyber-attacks and their real-world impact. Over the last decade the UK has delivered a wide range of interventions aimed at strengthening the UK’s cyber resilience, including through the creation of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). Resilience is a core element of the UK’s National Cyber Strategy. My colleague the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster spoke last week at the annual CYBER UK conference about the importance of resilience – how this is something we all need to take responsibility for, across the public and private sectors, to ensure that the benefits of technology are felt by the whole of society.

States have always had a duty to protect their external border from foreign attack but cyber has, in a sense, increased the size of that border, by an unimaginable factor. Viewed this way, the UK’s external border is no longer just around the corners of Great Britain and around Northern Ireland. It is located in every household and business in the country. But just because the scale of the challenge has increased, it does not change our fundamental duty to protect citizens, families and businesses from the array of threats present in cyberspace.

The UK has also developed a cutting-edge capability to carry out cyber operations to keep ourselves and our friends and allies protected from those who seek to harm us – the National Cyber Force. The National Cyber Force draws together personnel from intelligence and defence in this area under one unified command for the first time. It can conduct offensive cyber operations – flexible, scalable measures to meet a full range of operational requirements. And, importantly, the National Cyber Force operates under an established legal framework. Unlike some of our adversaries, it respects international law. It is important that democratic States can lawfully draw on the capabilities of offensive cyber, and its operation not be confined to those States which are content to act irresponsibly or to cause harm. This goes to the heart of how the UK operates as a responsible cyber power.

The role of law enforcement is also important. The police and National Crime Agency are focused on addressing the cybercrime threat here in the UK. Our domestic legislation such as the Computer Misuse Act enables the prosecution of criminals attacking our computer systems, and I have no doubt we will ensure that the law here in the UK will continue to evolve as the threat does. Law enforcement authorities are also working together across the globe, including on the basis of international agreements such as the Budapest Convention. This encourages a common approach to cybercrime, adopting appropriate domestic criminal law frameworks and fostering international cooperation. And closer cooperation in the criminal justice space means that ransomware gangs cannot act with impunity.

Coordination between States, in a more general sense, is also crucial in responding to hostile State activity in cyberspace and imposing a cost on those who seek to abuse the freedom and opportunity that technological progress has provided them. States are developing more sophisticated and coordinated diplomatic and economic responses. This can be seen in the response to the recent operation targeting Microsoft Exchange servers, where 39 partners including NATO, the EU and Japan coordinated in attributing hostile cyber activity to China. It can also be seen in the response to the Russian SolarWinds hack which saw coordinated US, UK and allied sanctions and other measures.

Working with States to reach shared agreement on prohibited behaviours for key sectors, like those I have set out today, will help us move beyond theoretical discussions around sovereignty and non-intervention. To help define what responsible cyber power means in practice.

When taken in collaboration with other efforts – improving resilience, promoting cyber security, international cooperation, and having the operational capability to respond effectively to those seeking to harm us – international law can help us all to realise this vision of a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace.
Closing

In closing, I will make a few final remarks.

International law matters in cyberspace because if we don’t shape the rules here, if we don’t have a clear framework to counter hostile activity in cyberspace, and if we don’t get cyber security right, the effects will be likely to be felt more often and in hugely disruptive ways by ordinary people.

For example, a single cyber breach in 2020 cost a local council here in the UK an estimated £10 million in recovery costs and significantly disrupted services provided to the local population for months by shutting down IT systems and stopping the council from carrying out property purchases within the borough.

Championing a cyber governance framework that is founded in international law means we can also provide a secure foundation for international partnerships on technology. To unlock the potential of fields such as Artificial Intelligence and quantum computing.

The UK and its allies are at the forefront of this work. Earlier this year, the Foreign Secretary concluded a Cyber and Critical Technology Partnership with her Australian counterpart to strengthen global technology supply chains and promote the UK’s positive technology vision.

Providing further detail on how international law applies in cyberspace, as I have sought to do today, will help us to more effectively ‘call out’ the most egregious hostile State behaviour as unlawful. The UK will continue to call out behaviour – both irresponsible and unlawful.

Our approach will also encourage more agile and decisive international action in response to specific threats, using our full freedom of manoeuvre within the law. It will help all States understand the parameters and thresholds of lawful or unlawful action. It will serve to avoid inadvertent or damaging escalations. And our approach will enable us to do these things in close partnership with the many other States who share our ambition to shape and strengthen the international order in future frontiers.

Thank you.

Home Secretary Priti Patel and Rwandan Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Dr. Vincent Biruta, today (Thursday, 19 May) carried out a series of joint engagements in Geneva.

Five weeks after the signing of the Migration and Economic Development Partnership (MEDP) in Kigali and following their meeting in London yesterday, the ministers travelled to Geneva to brief key figures working in the field of international migration.

The Home Secretary and Minister Biruta met with UN Permanent Representatives from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. Both ministers set out how the partnership of equals agreed between their two countries was facing up to a shared, global challenge and seeking to save lives. They emphasised their belief that further collective engagement was necessary to tackle the global migration crisis.

During the afternoon the Home Secretary and Dr. Biruta then had further engagements, including with Filippo Grandi, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Nada Al-Nashif, the United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights.

At both meetings, the Home Secretary and Dr Biruta sought to highlight the UK and Rwanda’s leadership on the international stage in addressing the issue of illegal migration while reinforcing their commitment to working in collaboration with UN agencies in this sphere.

They noted that the UK government’s assessment found Rwanda to be a fundamentally safe and secure country with a proud track record of supporting asylum seekers, including working with the UN Refugee Agency which itself has said the country has a safe and protective environment for refugees.

Furthermore, they emphasised that under our partnership Rwanda will process claims in accordance with the UN Refugee Convention and national and international human rights laws.

They recommitted to maintaining a positive ongoing dialogue with international partners and underlined how the ground-breaking partnership between the two countries will directly address the challenge of illegal migration while saving lives.

Rwandan Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Dr. Vincent Biruta, said:

Rwanda and the UNHCR have historically partnered to provide safe haven to those in need. Rwanda, with the agency’s support, evacuated African migrants from Libya to safety in Kigali.

This is just one example of Rwanda’s long history of offering those in need safety, dignity, and protection. While the UNHCR are entitled to their views on this partnership, they have no reason to doubt our motivations or our ability to offer sanctuary and opportunity to those seeking it – as we already are doing so for 130,000 refugees.

We welcome the opportunity to discuss this partnership with colleagues in the UNHCR to address their concerns and advance their understanding of what we’re proposing.

Home Secretary Priti Patel said:

All nations and international agencies must work together to address the issue of illegal migration collectively and urgently save lives.

Rwanda and the UK stand together in promoting a new, fairer, more effective global asylum system. Our Migration and Economic Development Partnership will deter criminality, exploitation and abuse, while supporting the humane and respectful treatment of refugees.

It was incredibly useful to discuss the partnership in detail with UN partners in Geneva today and assuage any concerns. We pay tribute to the UNHCR for their tireless efforts to support some of the most vulnerable people around the world.

The graves of Captain (Capt) Hugh Mortimer Travers DSO and Serjeant (Sjt) Frederick Cardy, who were killed on the Western Front whilst serving with Irish regiments, have been rededicated in Belgium more than a hundred years after they died.

The services, which were organised by the MOD’s Joint Casualty and Compassionate Centre (JCCC), also known as the ‘MOD War Detectives’, were held at the Commonwealth War Graves Commission’s (CWGC) New Irish Farm Cemetery and White House Cemetery, near Ypres.

Rosie Barron, JCCC case lead said: 

“It is always a privillage to work with The Royal Irish Regiment to organise these services and to discover more of Ireland’s unique experience of the First World War. Both Capt Travers and Sjt Cardy paid the ultimate sacrifice in the defence of freedom and justice and it is as vital today as ever that their sacrifices are not forgotten.”  

Capt Travers, aged 41, was a veteran of the Boer War. For his service in South Africa he received The Queen’s South Africa Medal with five clasps and The King’s South Africa Medal with two clasps. He also received The King George V Coronation Medal. Capt Travers was wearing these medal ribbons at the time of his death, which assisted with the identification of his grave.

The Adjutant of the battalion described Capt Travers as having ‘died the death of a soldier and a very gallant gentleman.’ Another member of the battalion stated that Captain Travers’ actions were ‘the coolest deed’ he had ever seen. ‘It was gloriously brave.’ As Capt Travers was recorded as missing he was commemorated on the Menin Gate.

The rededication service at New Irish Farm Cemetery was attended by members of Capt Travers’ family. Guy Travers, Capt Travers’ great nephew said:

“I am very happy that a service has been held for my Great Uncle, Captain HM Travers, after so many many years. I believe my grandfather, his brother, had no luck in finding him. This service is also for him. And of course Hugh’s fallen comrades. His stone is magnificent, I can’t thank the Commonwealth War Graves Commission enough.”

The final resting places of Capt Travers and Sjt Cardy were discovered after researchers submitted evidence to CWGC hoping to have located them. Further research conducted by CWGC, the National Army Museum and JCCC, agreed with their findings and the identifications were confirmed.

The services were attended by representatives of the British and Irish Embassies as well as serving soldiers of The Royal Irish Regiment. They were conducted by the Reverend Dr Isaac Thompson MBE, TD, DL, HCF, Chaplain to The Royal Irish Regiment.

The Reverend Dr Thompson said: 

“Hugh Travers, born in India into a family where his father and both of his grandfathers were Army officers, joined the Royal Munster Fusiliers in South Africa in 1893. Bravery appears to have oozed from this young man’s veins. As a forty-one year old he arrived in France in October 1914 but by November 1914 he was killed near Ypres. Those who witnessed his bravery said, “He died the death of a soldier and a very gallant gentleman.”

Capt Travers was a member of 5th Battalion The Royal Munster Fusiliers but on the outbreak of the First World War was attached to 2nd Battalion The Duke of Wellington’s (West Riding) Regiment. He was killed during a bayonet charge near Gheluvelt on 8 November 1914, when the battalion was ordered to retake trenches on the northern side of the Menin Road. He received the Distinguished Service Order for the part he played in this action. The citation for the gallatry medal read:

‘For conspicuous gallantry and ability on the 8th November 1914, near Ypres, in organising an attack and re-capturing a trench from the enemy, and subsequently for leading a second attack and capturing another position 50 yards further to the front. Captain Travers was killed whilst maintaining his post on this occasion.’

Sjt Cardy was serving with 7/8th Battalion The Royal Irish Fusiliers when he was killed during the Third Battle of Ypres. At around midnight on 10 August 1917 his battalion moved into the frontline north of Frezenberg. They were relieved at midnight on 12 August. It was during this time in the frontline that Serjeant Cardy was killed although the exact date is unknown. Sjt Cardy was buried and a wooden cross was erected over his grave. In 1919, his remains were concentrated into White House Cemetery, but it appears the original grave maker was damaged and he could not be identified. As Serjeant Cardy was missing he was commemorated the Menin Gate.

The Reverend Dr Thompson added:

“Frederick Cardy, a native of Suffolk, must have had his heart strings tugged to the limit when he learned of the birth of his son, Ralph back in England in July 1916. Within a year, in August 1917, this brave Royal Irish Fusilier, gave his life in the service of others, reflecting the motto of his regiment, “Faugh a Ballagh” (Irish for “Clear the Way”), a rallying cry that had inspired “Faughs” since 1811 and still today in their successors, The Royal Irish Regiment; young Cardy had cleared the way for his young son to grow up in a land free of war for another two decades.”  

The headstones over their graves will now be replaced by the CWGC, who will care for their final resting places in perpetuity. 

CWGC Commemorations Officer, Fergus Read, said:

“Having both been commemorated on the Ypres (Menin Gate) memorial until now, we are moved and honoured to be able to mark these brave men’s graves today. Thanks to the effort of many, the Commission will proudly care for their graves, and their memory, in perpetuity.”