Safety Recommendation documents updated
Took off with insufficient thrust for the environmental conditions and struck an obstacle after lift-off.
2017-016, 2017-017, 2018-012, 2018-013, 2018-014, 2018-015.
Loss of control on takeoff, Bourn Airfield, Cambridgeshire, 17 October 2016.
2017-013.
Crashed onto public road during air display, near Shoreham Airport, 22 August 2015.
2016-041, 2016-042, 2017-001, 2017-002, 2017-003, 2017-004, 2017-005, 2017-006, 2017-007, 2017-008, 2017-009, 2017-010, 2017-011.
Descent into terrain following departure from Stapleford Aerodrome, Essex, 3 October 2015.
2016-055.
Loss of elevator control during launch, Currock Hill Airfield, Northumbria, 8 April 2017.
2018-004.
Number 1 and 2 engine fan cowl doors detached during takeoff, London Heathrow Airport, 24 May 2013.
2015-001, 2015-003.
Controlled flight into terrain, Isle of Bute, 9 August 2014.
2015-009, 2015-010, 2015-011, 2015-012.
Left wing failed in flight, near Builth Wells, Powys, 18 September 2016.
2018-001.
Left landing gear collapse during landing at Doncaster Sheffield Airport, 15 August 2014.
2014-039.
Front Electric Sustainer (FES) battery fire during landing, Parham Airfield, West Sussex, 10 August 2017.
2017-018, 2017-019, 2017-020.
Loss of collective pitch control resulting in a forced landing, Bishopstone, near Salisbury, Wiltshire, 23 September 2016.
2017-012.
Flight into terrain after takeoff in fog and at night, near Gillingham Hall, Norfolk, 13 March 2014.
2015-024, 2015-025.
Loss of control in flight, near Sumburgh Airport, 15 December 2014
2016-050, 2016-051, 2016-052, 2016-053, 2016-054.
Left main landing gear collapsed during landing roll, East Midlands Airport, 14 January 2016.
2016-049.
In-flight loss of engine access panel, on departure from Manchester Airport, 14 December 2016.
2017-014, 2017-015.
Birdstrike on departure from Orlando International Airport, USA, 19 January 2013.
2013-015.
Crashed in the sea on approach to Sumburgh Airport in the Shetland Islands, 23 August 2013.
2016-005, 2016-008, 2016-011, 2016-019, 2016-020, 2016-021, 2016-022, 2016-024, 2016-025, 2016-026.
Response assessed ‘Not adequate – Closed’: 2016-023.
Loss of yaw control on landing at West Franklin Platform, North Sea, 28 December 2016.
2018-006, 2018-007.
Loss of power and unsuccessful forced landing, 1 nm north of Dinton, Wiltshire, 8 July 2016.
2017-021.
Emergency descent due to loss of cabin pressure, en route from London Heathrow to Delhi, 29 April 2017.
2018-008, 2018-009, 2018-010.
Emergency evacuation at parking stand after APU failure filled cabin with smoke, London Heathrow Airport, 26 June 2016.
2017-022, 2017-023, 2017-024, 2017-025, 2017-026, 2017-027, 2017-028, 2017-029.
High altitude stall and loss of control, northwest of Coventry, 31 December 2013.
2014-041, 2014-042.
Overrun on landing, Gorda Airport, British Virgin Islands (BVI), 11 February 2017.
2018-002, 2018-003.
Aircraft landed with crosswind component of 40 kt (maximum demonstrated crosswind component is 19.4 kt), Isle of Man (Ronaldsway) Airport, 23 February 2017.
2018-005.
Near runway overrun, Owen Roberts International Airport, Grand Cayman, 15 January 2014.
2014-036, 2014-037.
Airworthiness of aircraft registered overseas and resident in the UK.
2015-039, 2015-040.
Vaccine update: issue 297, July 2019
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Statement by the United Kingdom at the Extraordinary IAEA Board
Chair,
On behalf of the United Kingdom, I would like to express my deepest condolences to the family, friends and colleagues of Mr Amano. I quote the words of the previous Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, who had met Mr Amano. He said: “I was saddened to learn of the death of Yukiya Amano, long-standing Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. DG Amano upheld the highest standards of professionalism in the IAEA’s crucial work. He steered the IAEA with commitment and determination, navigating many complex issues”.
I myself can echo the statements of the distinguished colleagues before me, and would like to very briefly add my own personal reflections. Mr Amano led this organisation for a decade with tireless dedication and a great sense of duty. His tenure was dominated in the later years by the JCPOA, where he led the Agency’s crucial role in monitoring and verification of the deal in Iran with unwavering professionalism, impartiality and very astute political judgement.
He made great contributions on the nuclear applications side of the house, strengthening the link between these applications and their development potential, and showing commitment to the modernisation of the Seibersdorf labs. His tagline of ‘Atoms for Peace and Development’ is testament to his legacy.
In my personal relations with DG Amano, I found that he listened carefully, he showed a complete grasp of his portfolio and his organisation, and there was always a gentle twinkle of humour and wit. It is clear that Mr Amano has made a lasting impact across all areas of the IAEA’s work. The international community has lost a fine diplomat and a colleague.
Report 09/2019: Fatal collision between a tram and a pedestrian, near Saughton tram stop, Edinburgh
Summary
At 12:10 hrs on Tuesday 11 September 2018, a pedestrian who was using a footpath crossing near the Saughton tram stop, was struck and fatally injured by a tram travelling at 53 km/h (33 mph) from Edinburgh city centre towards Edinburgh airport.
The pedestrian was seemingly unaware that the tram was approaching when he walked onto the crossing. The evidence indicates that from the point where he would have had a clear view of the approaching tram, he was not looking out for trams. He may have looked earlier, but would not have had a clear view of approaching trams from the footpath.
Explanation of RAIB’s findings and recommendations
The investigation found that although the tram driver had used the tram’s bell to sound repeated warnings on the approach to the crossing, this audible warning was not sufficiently loud for it to be heard and acted upon by the pedestrian until it was too late.
The RAIB found that the tram’s audible warning devices were not sufficiently loud to provide an effective warning to pedestrians under many operational circumstances. It also found that Edinburgh Trams Limited did not have a process in place for regularly reviewing the risks at its off-street pedestrian crossings.
Recommendations
The RAIB has made four recommendations. One of the recommendations is for Edinburgh Trams Limited to improve the audibility of its trams’ warning devices. Another recommendation is for it to identify the risk factors associated with its off- street pedestrian crossings and to develop a process for regularly reviewing the risk control measures. Two further recommendations are made to the Light Rail Safety and Standards Board (LRSSB). One is to improve the current guidance on the audibility of tram warning devices and another is to improve the guidance on the design and layout of tram footpath crossings. The report also identifies a learning point concerning the importance of maintaining records relating to risks that have been identified during project safety assurance processes, and requesting appropriate technical expertise where necessary.
Notes to editors
- The sole purpose of RAIB investigations is to prevent future accidents and incidents and improve railway safety. RAIB does not establish blame, liability or carry out prosecutions.
- RAIB operates, as far as possible, in an open and transparent manner. While our investigations are completely independent of the railway industry, we do maintain close liaison with railway companies and if we discover matters that may affect the safety of the railway, we make sure that information about them is circulated to the right people as soon as possible, and certainly long before publication of our final report.
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