

Willingness to collaborate and bridge differences for the greater good underpins Security Council negotiations

The United Kingdom remains open to discussions on improving penholding. We welcome these discussions being taken forward shortly within the Informal Working Group on documentation and other procedural matters.

Colleagues, the penholding convention we know today is still relatively new. As mandated missions grew and files became more complex, the current approach evolved to provide efficiency, continuity and predictability.

This flexible and informal approach means that anyone can penhold and there are different ways of doing it. Indeed we have seen many valuable products initiated by elected members, particularly during their presidencies – such as on peacekeeping, WPS, climate security and protection of civilians.

We have also been open to co-penholding to enhance the process and have done so recently with Germany on Sudan and Libya sanctions and with Gabon on UNOCA.

The UK's approach to penholding reflects a deep sense of responsibility for the Council's role of addressing conflict and human suffering through proactive and practical action, and its mandate to address threats to international peace and security.

We strive to balance differing views. To reach consensus the UK has to go against our own national position. For example the fourth 3 month extension of the UNSMIL mandate last month; and the technical rollover of UNITAMS/Sudan mandate in June. The last time a UK-drafted resolution did not reach nine positive votes was in 1976.

Colleagues, the objective of improving working methods is surely for improving better outcomes, including Council products.

What underpins penholding it is what underpins all Council negotiations: the willingness of all of us to collaborate, listen and bridge national positions for the greater good.

But there is another approach pursued by the Russian Federation. Not engaging in negotiations, then tabling alternative texts for a vote, without taking into account the views of most Council members, is not consistent with this spirit of collaboration. Such showdowns are not best practice.

We note that the Russian Federation has initiated texts themselves, on Libya, WPS and on the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. These were not successful because they refused to take account of other views to reach

consensus.

Colleagues, Note 507 – agreed recently in 2017 – sets out helpful guidance for enhancing ‘the full participation of Council members in the preparation of Council documents’.

The UK strives to take a professional, transparent, consensus-based, collaborative approach to enable all stakeholders time to articulate their views. Consulting the host government and the region early is critical for us. For example, the two technical rollovers of AMISOM in 2021 and 2022 ensured African partners and the African Union were ready to engage on a substantive reconfiguration of the mission.

We welcome further suggestions for how the process can be improved further and look forward to constructive discussions in the IWG.

Finally colleagues, it needs no reminding that Russia has convened this discussion today on working methods while their invasion of Ukraine – now six months in – remains in flagrant breach of the UN Charter – the very foundation that underpins everything the Council does and how it functions.

[UK and allies agree expanded International Fund for Ukraine support](#)

At the Copenhagen Conference today, the UK and a coalition of key allies and partners have agreed to expand the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) to finance military training and equipment for Ukraine to help the country free itself from Russia’s invasion.

Britain will put £250 million of [the recently announced £1 billion](#) into the IFU, a flexible low-bureaucracy fund, which will be used to provide military equipment and other support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). The fund will ensure a steady flow of money not just for the provision of vital new weapons, but the essential maintenance and repair of existing kit, and training to maximise the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s effectiveness on the battlefield.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace met counterparts from fellow co-hosts Denmark and Ukraine in Copenhagen, along with representatives from other partner nations, to put together a plan for long-term military support for Ukraine.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said:

This conference sends a clear message to Russia. We will not tire and we will stand by Ukraine today, tomorrow and in the months to

come.

The UK and partner nations have agreed to provide long-term military funding, ensuring a steady flow of finance to provide vital military equipment, essential maintenance of existing kit and maximising our UK-led international training programme for Ukraine's Armed Forces.

The allies also discussed how to evolve their support for the training of Ukrainian military personnel, including offers for expanding and coordinating the international training scheme begun by the UK.

Britain has so far trained more than 2,300 Ukrainian personnel in the UK under a training programme announced in June. Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Germany and Latvia have announced they will be joining the initiative, after the Netherlands previously announced its intention to support the scheme.

It comes after the UK [announced it would send additional multiple launch rocket system \(MLRS\) launchers](#), along with a significant number of precision guided rockets to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia's indiscriminate use of artillery.

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[Statement by the Troika and the EU on the conflict in South Sudan](#)

World news story

The UK, the United States, Norway and the EU acknowledge the Roadmap toward the end of a transitional government, calling for action and welcoming a commitment to peace



UK Government

The Troika, the EU and its Member States acknowledge the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity's announcement of a Roadmap towards the end of transition.

We note that the Roadmap includes details of the actions that will be taken and the timeframes for delivery. We share our expectation that this agreement will now translate into the sustained action required to deliver the Roadmap. We note with concern that the necessity for an extension to the peace process is the result of choices made by the government not to take the necessary steps that would have led to implementation.

Only sustained action and results, particularly on oil revenue transparency, as well as public financial and resources management, will generate the donor support requested by the Government of South Sudan. In this regard, we note the Government's announcement to allocate specific funds in the 2022-23 budget for implementing the Peace agreement and the Roadmap. We urge the Government to disburse those funds in predictable and transparent ways in order for the international community to regain confidence.

We regret that the process of finalising the Roadmap was insufficiently inclusive. Civil society groups were given only limited time to review and comment on the Government's proposal. We regard the inclusivity of any process as key to its legitimacy and urge the Government to consult in more detail before the process of ratifying the extension set out in article 8.4 of R-ARCSS is completed. Furthermore, we call on the Government to expand political and civic space to ensure that the voices of the South Sudanese people, including those who hold opposing views, are consistently heard

throughout the implementation of the Roadmap.

The people of South Sudan, the Troika, the EU and its Member States, and the wider international community will judge deeds, not words. We need to see what will be different this time. To build confidence the Government should immediately demonstrate significant progress towards implementation of the outstanding elements of R-ARCSS, in accordance with the deadlines set out in the Roadmap. Ratification of the extension of the transition should occur after the government has demonstrated the sustained action and results promised in the Roadmap. It is through meeting the deadlines set out in the Roadmap that the Government can earn our collective trust.

Finally, we welcome President Kiir and First Vice President Machar's reiteration of their commitment to peace. We remain convinced that the only path to peace, prosperity, and democracy for all South Sudanese lies in action by the country's leaders to fulfil their promises and include all South Sudanese in a shared vision of their nation's future.

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