COP26 President-Designate Alok Sharma said:

“COP26 has already been postponed by one year, and we are all too aware climate change has not taken time off. The recent IPCC report underlines why COP26 must go ahead this November to allow world leaders to come together and set out decisive commitments to tackle climate change.

“We are working tirelessly with all our partners, including the Scottish Government and the UN, to ensure an inclusive, accessible and safe summit in Glasgow with a comprehensive set of COVID mitigation measures. This includes an offer from the UK Government to fund the required quarantine hotel stays for registered delegates arriving from red list areas and to vaccinate accredited delegates who would be unable otherwise to get vaccinated.

“Ensuring that the voices of those most affected by climate change are heard is a priority for the COP26 Presidency, and if we are to deliver for our planet, we need all countries and civil society to bring their ideas and ambition to Glasgow.”

Background:

• Vaccination is very strongly recommended for everyone coming to COP and delegates who have registered for a vaccine through the accreditation process are set to begin receiving their first dose this week.

• The offer of funding the required managed quarantine stays is to party delegates, observers and media who are arriving from red list areas who would otherwise find it difficult to attend COP, including all those from the Global South.

• It is available to individuals who are both vaccinated and unvaccinated.

• Delegates from red listed countries who are fully vaccinated will have to quarantine on arrival for five days. Unvaccinated delegates for ten days.

• Like many international events, the way COP operates has to adapt to the COVID context. As we make arrangements for COP26, ensuring the health of participants and the local community is of utmost importance.

• Decisions on Travel Restrictions and vaccines for COP26, in light of COVID, have been developed by the UK Government and Scottish Government and based on public health advice.

Dragon Event Security Ltd and its two directors, Darrel Baldwin and Anthony Stone, were sentenced on the same day. Dragon Event Security Ltd was fined £390 and required to pay a victim surcharge of £39. Darrel Baldwin was fined £390 required to pay £480 court costs and a victim surcharge of £39. Fellow director Anthony Stone was also fined £390 and required to pay costs of £480 and a victim surcharge of £39. The former directors claimed to be dissolving Dragon Event Security Ltd which was founded on 20 January 2020.

The prosecution started with an SIA investigation into Darrel Baldwin’s former business, Stay Safe Events Support Ltd, for the alleged supply of illegal security. By the time the investigation gathered momentum the business had become Dragon Event Security Ltd.

SIA investigators discovered that Dragon Event Security was illegally displaying SIA Approved Contractor Scheme (ACS) status on company vans and on social media. Dragon Event Security has never been an SIA approved contractor. The SIA’s investigators asked Dragon several times to remove the ACS accreditation mark from its company vehicles and its Facebook profile. The directors refused to engage with the SIA and continued to display their false status.

This left the SIA no other option but to prosecute.

Nathan Salmon, one of the SIA’s criminal investigations managers, said:

The business falsely advertised that they had been awarded ACS accreditation. Dragon Event Security attempted to win lucrative business by purporting to be vetted and having gone through the rigorous process to be an approved contractor. Their persistent behaviour has landed them in court and as a result they have received fines and criminal records. This is a lesson for anyone who seeks to illegally display our ACS accreditation; we will prosecute any business who continues to purport to be something they are not.

Notes to editors:

• By law, security operatives working under contract must hold and display a valid SIA licence. Information about SIA enforcement and penalties can be found on GOV.UK.
• The Approved Contractor Scheme (ACS) is voluntary and exists to raise performance standards. To be an approved contractor a business needs to meet a sector-specific approval based on a relevant set of qualifying criteria that is independently assessed.
• The offences relating to the Private Security Industry Act (2001) that are mentioned in the release are as follows:
  • 1 x count of Section 16 (right to use the Approved Contractor Scheme logo)
  • 2 x counts of Section 16 via Section 23 (criminal liability of the directors)
• The Private Security Industry Act 2001 is available online.
• The SIA recently published guidance about sub-contracting suppliers to events.

Further information:

• The Security Industry Authority is the organisation responsible for regulating the private security industry in the United Kingdom, reporting to the Home Secretary under the terms of the Private Security Industry Act 2001. Our main duties are: the compulsory licensing of individuals undertaking designated activities; and managing the voluntary Approved Contractor Scheme.
• For further information about the Security Industry Authority visit www.gov.uk/sia. The SIA is also on Facebook (Security Industry Authority) and Twitter (SIAuk).

Summary

At about 10:10 hrs on 26 May 2020, at Waterloo Underground station in London, a passenger fell into the gap between the northbound Bakerloo line platform and the train from which he had just alighted. A large gap existed between the train and the platform because of the track curvature at the location of the passenger’s fall. The passenger was unable to free himself and the train departed with the passenger still in the gap, crushing him as it moved off. He remained motionless on the track and was subsequently hit by a second train that entered the station.

The accident occurred when there were no staff or other members of public nearby to assist the fallen passenger. Train despatch on the Bakerloo line platforms at Waterloo was undertaken by the train operator (driver) using a closed-circuit television system to view the side of the train alongside the platform. With only his head and arm above platform level, the passenger was difficult to detect on the despatch monitors, and was not seen by the train operator. The operator of the following train was unaware of the passenger because their attention was focused on the platform and the train’s stopping point, until after the train had struck the passenger.

The investigation found that London Underground’s risk assessment processes did not enable the identification and detailed assessment of all factors that contributed to higher platform-train interface (PTI) risk at certain platforms. Consequently, although London Underground had implemented some location-specific mitigation measures at the PTI, it had not fully quantified the contribution of curved platforms to the overall PTI risk, and so was unable to fully assess the potential benefits of additional mitigation at these locations.

The investigation also found that the model used by London Underground to quantify system risk makes no allowance for non-fatal injuries, and so understates the risk of harm to passengers at the PTI and presents an incomplete picture of system risk, with the potential to affect London Underground’s safety decision making.

Recommendations

RAIB has made three recommendations to London Underground. The first relates to the need to recognise and assess location-specific risks so they can be properly managed. The second deals with the need to ensure that safety management processes include the ongoing evaluation of existing safety measures at stations, and provide periodic risk assessment for individual locations at intervals which reflect the level of risk present. The third recommendation relates to the need for effective delivery of actions proposed by internal investigation recommendations.

Notes to editors

1. The sole purpose of RAIB investigations is to prevent future accidents and incidents and improve railway safety. RAIB does not establish blame, liability or carry out prosecutions.
2. RAIB operates, as far as possible, in an open and transparent manner. While our investigations are completely independent of the railway industry, we do maintain close liaison with railway companies and if we discover matters that may affect the safety of the railway, we make sure that information about them is circulated to the right people as soon as possible, and certainly long before publication of our final report.
3. For media enquiries, please call 01932 440015.

Newsdate: 7 September 2021