Following is a question by the Hon Jeremy Tam and a written reply by the Acting Secretary for Security, Mr Sonny Au, in the Legislative Council today (November 21):
 
Question:
 
     It has been reported that some cross-boundary "bogus marriage" syndicates provide one-stop services.  Such services include: arranging "bogus marriage" for their clients to facilitate their application for Permits for Proceeding to Hong Kong and Macao (commonly known as One-way Permits (OWPs)), and taking care of the divorce procedure on behalf of their clients after they come to settle in Hong Kong.  On combating "bogus marriage", will the Government inform this Council:
 
(1) of the number of divorces and the divorce rate in each of the past five years in respect of those couples who were both Hong Kong permanent residents (HKPRs), with a breakdown by duration of marriage (namely, two years or below, three to four years, five to six years and seven to nine years);
 
(2) whether it will start compiling statistics on the number of divorces and divorce rates in respect of those couples one party to which is a person who came to Hong Kong for settlement on OWPs, broken down by such persons' year of residence (namely, two years or below, three to four years, five to six years and seven to nine years) in Hong Kong, for comparison with the corresponding figures in (1); if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;
 
(3) whether OWP holders who have settled in Hong Kong for less than seven years will, for the reason of their divorce with HKPRs, have their Hong Kong identity cards and residence status invalidated by the Immigration Department (ImmD) and be subject to repatriation to their places of origin;
 
(4) among the 1 542 suspected "bogus marriage" cases investigated by ImmD in the past three years, of the number of those in which ImmD decided, after proactively analysing the relevant situation, to initiate investigations;
 
(5) of the statistics on convictions in each of the past five years involving offences related to "bogus marriage" (set out in the table below); and

 
(6) of the number of spot checks by home visits conducted by ImmD in the past five years for investigating suspected "bogus marriage" cases; the respective numbers of offenders who were arrested, prosecuted and convicted as a result of the evidence obtained from (i) such operations and (ii) all operations other than such operations, and the percentages of those figures in the total number of suspected "bogus marriage" cases?
 
Reply:
 
President,
 
     The Government has always been concerned about "bogus marriages".  The Immigration Department (ImmD) set up a special task force in 2006 to step up enforcement actions to combat such offences to prevent persons seeking entry into Hong Kong by means of "bogus marriages" and intermediaries aiding others to seek entry into Hong Kong through such means.  When suspected "bogus marriage" cases are identified, ImmD will conduct in-depth investigations on parties alleged to arrange and participate in "bogus marriages", collect evidence and initiate prosecution.
 
     Any persons who make use of "bogus marriage" to obtain the requisite documents for the purpose of entering Hong Kong, or any persons who facilitate others to achieve such purpose through arranging "bogus marriages" for them, shall be guilty of an offence.  In the course of contracting "bogus marriages" and applying for entries into Hong Kong through such marriages, the persons involved may have committed offences such as conspiracy to defraud, making false representation to ImmD officers, making a false oath, giving false declaration, bigamy, etc., and are liable on conviction to imprisonment for up to 14 years. 
 
     The reply to the questions raised by the Hon Tam is as follows:
 
(1) and (2) To get a divorce in Hong Kong, one should file a petition or an application for divorce to the court, and it does not need to be processed by marriage registries under ImmD.  In consultation with the Census and Statistics Department (C&SD) and the Judiciary, it is noted that they do not maintain the statistics mentioned in the question. ImmD also does not have relevant figures.  In fact, ImmD has conducted investigations into suspected "bogus marriage" cases via different channels and has been closely monitoring the latest practice and trends of arranging "bogus marriage" by illegal intermediaries and "bogus marriage" syndicates.  From experience, collecting the divorce-related statistics requested in the question serves no direct purpose in assisting the enforcement authorities to detect suspected persons participating in "bogus marriages" as well as verifying the husband-and-wife relationships of the persons concerned in the course of investigation.  At present, therefore, we have no plan to compile such statistical figures.  According to the records stated in the feature article named "Marriage and Divorce Trends in Hong Kong, 1991 to 2016" published by C&SD in January 2018, the numbers of divorce decrees granted between 2012 and 2016 are as follows:
 

 
(3) and (4) ImmD has an established mechanism for handling cases of obtaining One-way Permits (OWPs) by fraudulent means.  ImmD will also initiate investigation into doubtful marriages, receive intelligence and collect evidence from various sources and through different channels in order to investigate thoroughly the parties to suspected "bogus marriage" cases and the intermediaries involved.  The relevant persons will be prosecuted when there is sufficient evidence.  Once a case is substantiated, ImmD can declare the invalidation of a person's Hong Kong Identity Card, regardless of whether that person is a holder of Hong Kong Permanent Identity Card or has settled in Hong Kong for less than seven years and has divorced his/her Hong Kong permanent resident spouse.  In addition, regardless of his/her years of residence in Hong Kong, ImmD has the authority to remove him/her from Hong Kong.  ImmD does not maintain the relevant statistical figures mentioned in the question.
 
     In processing OWP applications under the category of "reunion with spouses" and in case the husband-and-wife relationship is in doubt, the Mainland authorities will pass the particulars of the applicants and their spouses in Hong Kong to ImmD for verification of the personal particulars of the Hong Kong residents, their certificates of registration of marriage in Hong Kong or other relevant records. When suspected cases of "bogus marriage" or bigamy are identified, ImmD will initiate follow-up actions and notify the Mainland authorities of the verification results for follow-up.
 
     ImmD has always been collecting intelligence of suspected "bogus marriage" through different channels and will initiate investigation and detect "bogus marriage" cases.  In the 1 542 suspected "bogus marriage" cases investigated in the past three years, ImmD initiated investigations after proactively conducting in-depth analysis of information and intelligence gathered via different channels, which include but are not limited to the following:
 
(i) when conducting immigration examinations on arriving passengers, ImmD critically scrutinises doubtful visitors coming to visit their spouses in Hong Kong on strength of "exit endorsement for visiting relatives" and will refuse their entries if their purposes of visit are in doubt;
(ii) pays particular attention to Mainland residents holding "exit endorsement for visiting relatives" during anti-illegal worker operations;
(iii) marriage registries step up examination on suspicious marriage registrations; and
(iv) initiates investigation into criminal syndicates which publish advertisements with wordings such as "making quick cash" and "intermediary for Mainland-Hong Kong marriages" to allure people to engage in "bogus marriage" on social networking and instant messaging mobile applications, as well as newspapers and web pages.
 
     In addition, in processing OWP applications under the category of "reunion with spouses" and in case the husband-and-wife relationship is in doubt, the Mainland authorities will pass the particulars of the applicants and their spouses in Hong Kong to ImmD for investigation.  ImmD also from time to time receives suspected "bogus marriage" cases referred from other government departments in Hong Kong or reported by the public.
 
     When suspected "bogus marriage" cases are identified, regardless of their sources, ImmD will proactively collect evidence through various channels, conduct thorough investigations on parties to the suspected "bogus marriage" and relevant intermediaries, and prosecute offenders where there is sufficient evidence.
 
(5) From 2013 to 2017, ImmD investigated into a total of 2 744 suspected cases of "bogus marriage", 5 208 persons were arrested as a result, out of which 606 persons were successfully convicted.  Relevant statistics with breakdown by year is at the table below.  In criminal prosecutions, the court requires the highest standard of proof of "beyond reasonable doubt".  As it is not easy to prove the false husband-and-wife relationship, many difficulties have to be overcome in the course of adducing the proof.  Therefore, not all cases can be successfully prosecuted.  ImmD has to rely on corroborating evidence, such as the movement records of the couple and the statements of other witnesses and parties to the cases to instigate prosecutions against such offences.  ImmD does not maintain other statistics with breakdown mentioned in the question.
 

Note: The year of initiating investigation and completing prosecution against all parties to the cases may be different.  As such, the number of persons successfully prosecuted generally does not correspond to the number of cases in the same year.
 
(6) In general, in handling suspected "bogus marriage" cases, the enforcement officers of ImmD will collect evidence through different channels, including carrying out spot checks by home visits, collecting circumstantial evidence and proof, conducting separate interviews with persons involved, etc, to verify the husband-and-wife relationships of the persons in the cases.  In view of the uniqueness of each "bogus marriage" case, appropriate ways of collecting evidence and the evidence needed vary.  The investigation officers will apply different and possibly more than one investigation methods according to the background and circumstances of each case.  ImmD does not maintain the relevant statistical figures mentioned in the question.
 
     To more effectively combat "bogus marriage", ImmD will continue to take various investigation actions with flexibility and skills in view of the trend of "bogus marriages" and circumstances of individual cases.  ImmD will also continue to be committed to combating  offences related to "bogus marriage" by stepping up enforcement, publicity, intelligence analysis and cross-boundary co-operation with a view to bringing the offenders to justice.

     Following is a question by the Hon Charles Peter Mok and a written reply by the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Mr James Lau, in the Legislative Council today (November 21):
 
Question:
 
     It has been reported that loopholes were uncovered in the procedure for binding credit cards or bank accounts with stored value facilities (e-wallets). As the binding procedure of some credit cards did not include a two-factor authentication via mobile phone short message service (SMS) for identity verification, fraudsters could complete the binding procedure using an anonymous mobile phone card (commonly known as "prepaid SIM card"). Also, as there were loopholes in the process for e-wallet users to set up direct debit authorisation (eDDA) through the Faster Payment System, fraudsters could set up eDDA using prepaid SIM cards and stolen bank account information and then steal money through money transfers. Moreover, some members of the public have relayed to me that the frequent uncovering of security loopholes in the procedure for binding credit cards or bank accounts has undermined their confidence in electronic payment services and the development of financial technologies. After completing a review on the eDDA setup process at the end of last month, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) requested e-wallet operators and banks to refine such process. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
 
(1) of (i) the total number of reports on frauds involving e-wallets received by the Police and HKMA since January this year and the total amount of money involved, and (ii) the details of the follow-up actions taken on such cases, including the investigation progress and the respective numbers of persons arrested and prosecuted;
 
(2) of the details and effectiveness of the measures taken to refine the eDDA setup process;
 
(3) whether it had required e-wallet operators and card-issuing banks to conduct security risk assessments before they launched e-wallets; if so, whether the scope of such assessments included if reliable identity verification arrangements were in place for the procedure for binding credit cards with e-wallets;
 
(4) whether it will stipulate that the procedure for binding credit cards with e-wallets must adopt a two-factor authentication (such as via SMS verification) or other effective measures for identity verification, in order to eradicate the aforesaid frauds; and
 
(5) as HKMA, in collaboration with the Mainland authorities, is introducing measures to facilitate cross-boundary electronic payment services (e.g. the trial use of Hong Kong's e-wallets on the Mainland), whether HKMA has assessed the risks posed by such measures to the personal data privacy of Hong Kong residents; if so, of the outcome and the corresponding measures; in view of the differences in the laws and regulations between the two places, how the authorities protect the consumer rights and interests as well as personal data privacy of those Hong Kong people who use cross-boundary electronic payment services?
 
Reply:
 
President,
 
     The Faster Payment System (FPS) is a new financial infrastructure, connecting banks and stored-value facility (SVF) operators. It enables the public to transfer funds instantly anytime, anywhere, across different banks and SVF operators. While the FPS should bring convenience to the public, we need to ensure that the system is safe and reliable so that the public can use the system with ease and confidence. In response to reports of fraud cases involving the FPS, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) had taken immediate remedial actions by requesting SVF operators to strengthen the verification requirement so as to close the security loophole.
 
     Our reply to the various parts of the question is as follows:
 
(1) and (2) Earlier there were suspected cases of individual's personal information and bank account information being stolen. Fraudsters used such stolen information to set up direct debit authorisation, including electronic direct debit authorisation (eDDA) through the FPS, in e-wallets provided by SVF operators. In light of these incidents, the HKMA immediately requested SVF operators to suspend direct debit authorisation services. The HKMA subsequently announced a set of refined procedures on October 26 for setting up direct debit authorisation in e-wallets to prevent an eDDA from being set up with information obtained by unlawful means. These refined procedures include:
 
(a) the user will receive an SMS notification from his/her bank to confirm the setting-up of eDDA;
(b) the user will need to make a one-time credit transfer from the relevant bank account to his/her e-wallet so as to confirm the e-wallet user is the same as the bank account owner; or
(c) two-factor authentication by the banks.
 
     The above refined procedures could enhance consumer protection and allow SVF operators and banks to take appropriate measures to resume their services having regard to their operational conditions. SVF operators are gradually resuming their direct debit authorisation services in accordance with the refined procedures above.
 
     Based on information obtained by the HKMA, some twenty bank accounts were compromised and the information therein was used to set up direct debit authorisations through e-wallets. The amount of money involved was around HK$500,000. The Police are following up on these cases. In general, bank account owners who have not authorised direct debit authorisation set-up will not be held liable. The HKMA has been closely following up the reported cases with the relevant banks and SVF operators. The majority of the cases have been reviewed, and the bank account owners concerned have been reimbursed through their banks. While the eDDA in question were conducted through the FPS, the nature of the incidents was about stolen personal information, and did not involve the security of the FPS.
 
(3) and (4) Regarding the process of binding credit cards with e-wallets provided by SVF operators, the HKMA has earlier issued guidance to SVF operators that support credit card binding service. Specifically, SVF operators are required to implement appropriate arrangements to confirm that the cardholder has given consent when a credit card is bound to an e-wallet account. To enhance consumer protection, the HKMA has further clarified the above guidance and set out clearly that the binding of a credit card to an e-wallet account should only be allowed if the relevant card issuer can confirm the cardholder's consent through SMS one-time password or other effective means.
 
(5) SVF operators must comply with the HKMA's regulatory requirements on payment security, information system management, user protection, etc. for its day-to-day operation, including the launch of new services. For instance, an SVF operator should have policies and procedures in place on storage of account information and bear the loss of the value stored in a user account where there is no fault on the part of the user. An SVF operator is also required to comply with other relevant regulations, including the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, and assess the relevant risks and control measures of the services in a prudent manner. An SVF operator should also consider the characteristics of individual services and balance them against the user experience when formulating specific security control measures. An SVF operator should keep those measures under review from time to time and make appropriate adjustment in light of the actual operations to ensure that the users' interests are protected. The HKMA will review the SVF operators' implementation of relevant measures during its regular supervision.

     The Correctional Services Department (CSD) today (November 21) launched an operation at Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre to combat illicit activities by persons in custody.

     In recent months, Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre has taken a series of operations against illicit trading of food among its remand persons in custody and, at around 8am today, placed two male remand persons in custody on disciplinary report for being in possession of unauthorised articles. The institution management then received intelligence that some persons in custody planned to organise collective illicit activities with a view to acting against the management, who immediately kept the development under close monitoring.

     At around 10.30am today, a total of 66 male remand persons in custody lodged a collective complaint demanding the management to rescind any disciplinary action against the aforementioned two male persons in custody. Following assessment and detailed planning, the CSD deployed reinforcements and resources to Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre, including a regional response team, support teams and a dog unit, at 2pm today to conduct a surprise search on target locations and persons. During the operation, five remand persons in custody suspected of inciting fellow persons in custody to engage in collective illicit activities were removed from association with each other and put under investigation. The CSD will continue to closely monitor the development.

     In order to assist persons in custody to rehabilitate in a safe and orderly environment, the CSD spares no effort in combating illicit activities of all kinds in its institutions.

     Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre is a maximum security prison for the detention of male adult persons in custody who are mostly on remand.

     A number of Government officials received seasonal influenza vaccination (SIV) today (November 21) and appealed to the public to prepare for the winter influenza season by receiving vaccination.  

     Officials receiving vaccination today were the Secretary for Labour and Welfare, Dr Law Chi-kwong; the Secretary for Development, Mr Michael Wong; the Secretary for Education, Mr Kevin Yeung; the Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, Mr Patrick Nip; the Acting Secretary for Security, Mr Sonny Au; the Director of the Chief Executive's Office, Mr Chan Kwok-ki; the Under Secretary for Education, Dr Choi Yuk-lin; the Under Secretary for Food and Health, Dr Chui Tak-yi; the Under Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Mr Joseph Chan; the Under Secretary for Home Affairs, Mr Jack Chan; and the Under Secretary for Transport and Housing, Dr Raymond So.

     The Secretary for Food and Health, Professor Sophia Chan, was also present to show her support. She said, "Seasonal influenza can cause serious illnesses. Besides high-risk groups such as the elderly, children and immunocompromised patients, healthy people may also contract influenza and develop complications. Vaccination is one of the most effective ways to prevent influenza and therefore members of the public should receive vaccination early to protect themselves against influenza and its complications, hence reducing the risk of hospitalisation and death.

     "To enhance the uptake rate among primary school children, the Department of Health has launched the School Outreach Vaccination Pilot Programme this year to reach out to 184 primary schools and provide vaccination to their students through outreach teams. As of November 18, 2018, some 56 000 students have received vaccination under the Pilot Programme."
 
     In addition, the coverage of the Vaccination Subsidy Scheme (VSS) has been extended from Hong Kong people aged 65 or above to those aged 50 or above.
 
     Professor Chan added, "As of November 18, 2018, some 218 000 doses of SIV had been administered via the Government Vaccination Programme (GVP) and around 316 000 doses had been administered via the VSS. Along with the Pilot Programme, so far around 590 000 doses have been administered under various programmes launched by the Government, representing an increase of nearly 53 per cent from the same period in the 2017/18 season."
 
     As it takes about two weeks after vaccination for antibodies to develop in the body to prevent seasonal influenza viruses, the Government encourages people aged 6 months or above, except those with known contraindications, to receive vaccination early to avoid infection of influenza and its complications. Please refer to the webpage of the Centre for Health Protection (www.chp.gov.hk/en/features/17980.html) for details of various vaccination programmes.

          

     Hong Kong Customs and Mainland Customs conducted a joint operation from October 29 to November 18 to combat cross-boundary counterfeit goods activities. During the operation, Hong Kong Customs seized about 58 000 pieces of suspected counterfeit goods, including footwear, clothes, leather products and sports products with an estimated market value of about $1.7 million.

     The two Customs administrations stepped up inspection of sea cargo during the operation and Hong Kong Customs seized the suspected counterfeit goods, effectively curbing cross-boundary counterfeit goods activities.

     Hong Kong Customs and Mainland Customs have been working closely to combat cross-boundary counterfeiting activities through intelligence exchanges and joint enforcement actions.

     Hong Kong Customs will continue to collaborate closely with the Mainland and overseas law enforcement agencies targeting cross-boundary counterfeiting activities.

     Under the Trade Descriptions Ordinance, any person who imports or exports counterfeit goods commits an offence. The maximum penalty upon conviction is a fine of $500,000 and imprisonment for five years.

     Members of the public may report any suspected counterfeiting activities to Customs' 24-hour hotline 2545 6182 or its dedicated crime-reporting email account (crimereport@customs.gov.hk).